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Abstract
Indicators of ﬁnancial crisis generally do not have a good track record. This paper
presents an early warning system for six countries in Asia, in which indicators do
work. We distinguish three types of ﬁnancial crises, currency crises, banking crises
and debt crises, and extract four groups of indicators from the literature—external,
ﬁnancial, domestic (real and public), and global indicators—that are likely to af-
fect the probability of ﬁnancial crises. The signiﬁcance of the indicator groups is
tested in a multivariate logit model on a panel of six Asian countries for the period
1970:01-2001:12. An additional feature is that we examine four different currency
crisis dating deﬁnitions. A within-sample signal extraction experiment reveals that
some currency crises dating schemes outperform others.
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11. Introduction
Four waves of ﬁnancial crises have hit international capital markets during the 1990s:
the European Monetary System (ERM) crisis in 1992-1993, the collapse of the Mexican
peso with ’tequila effects’ in 1994-1995, the Asian ﬂu of 1997-1998, and the Russia virus
in 1998. These ﬁnancial crises stimulated the theoretical and empirical literature on the
economics of the crises in several ways, among other things on the determinants of a crisis
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), its impact on domestic output (Aghion, Bacchetta, and
Banerjee, 2001), and policy implications (Rogoff, 1999).
In view of the large costs associated with a ﬁnancial crisis, the question of how to predict
a crisis has become central. This resulted in the construction of a monitoring tool, the so-
called early warning system (EWS). An EWS consists of a precise deﬁnition of a crisis
and a mechanism for generating predictions of crises (Edison, 2003). Three varieties of
ﬁnancial crises are distinguished: currency crises, banking crises, and debt crises. Concise
deﬁnitions are provided in Section 3 below. Several mechanisms have been suggested.
The most popular one is to use qualitative response (logit or probit) models. Examples are
Frankel and Rose (1996), who study currency crises and Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache
(1997, 2000) on banking crises. Alternatives are cross-country regression models with
dummy variables as put forward by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), graphical event
studies as suggested by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and the signal extraction
approach, a probabilistic model proposed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) (and
recently applied by Subbaraman, Jones and Shiraishi (2003)). In the latter mechanism
values of individual indicators are compared between crisis periods and tranquil periods.
If the value of an indicator exceeds a threshold, it signals an impending crisis. A common
feature of all existing EWS studies is the use of fundamental determinants of the domestic
and external sectors as explanatory variables.
This paper develops an econometric EWS for six Asian countries, Malaysia, Indone-
sia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. The Asian ﬂu hit Thailand and
spread to other countries—except Singapore—almost instantaneously. We set up qualita-
tive choice models, in our case logit models, for currency crises, banking crises and debt
crises with indicators extracted from a broad set of potentially relevant ﬁnancial crisis in-
dicators.1 The set-up of our EWS is similar to Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001) and
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2001), who also adopt a binomial multivariate qualitative re-
sponse approach. However, while the ﬁnal result of their (unreported) speciﬁcation search
is combinations of indicators as explanatory variables, we apply factor analysis to reduce
the information set and include factors for groups of variables as explanatory variables
in our EWS. The models are estimated using panel data for the January 1970–December
2001 period. The factor analysis outcomes in combination with the estimation results al-
low the general conclusion that (some) indicators of ﬁnancial crises do work, at least in
our EWS of Asia. This ﬁnding is in contrast with Edison (2003), who notes that the per-
1. Unfortunately, we cannot adopt the main recommendation of Eichengreen and Portes (1987), i.e., to treat
the three categories of crises simultaneously, because among other things the number of crisis observations is
too low.
2formance of EWS is generally poor and at best mixed. Our method—the combination of
factor analysis and logit modeling—enables us to answer the question whether additional
indicators have explanatory power for ﬁnancial crises, as proposed by Bustelo (2000). It
also allows us to dismiss uninformative indicators. In particular, we ﬁnd that the rates of
growth of money (M1 and M2), bank deposits, GDP per capita and national savings cor-
relate with all three types of ﬁnancial crises, whereas the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves,
and the growth of foreign reserves, the domestic real interest rate and inﬂation play an
additional role in banking crises and some varieties of currency crises.
An additional feature of our paper is that we distinguish four currency crisis dating deﬁni-
tions.2 A priori we do not prefer one of these deﬁnitions. However, a within-sample signal
extraction experiment reveals that the methods of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz and
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhard are superior to the dating schemes of Frankel and Rose,
and Zhang. An out-of-sample forecasting experiment is included to illustrate the quality
of our EWS.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the EWS literature focusing
on various methods to measure and date currency crises, banking crises and debt crises,
and ﬁnancial crises indicators. Section 3 describes the methodology adopted in this paper
to measure ﬁnancial crises, currency crises, banking crises and debt crises. The results—
dummy variables indicating dates of various crises—are summarized in frequency tables
which reveal information on the distribution of each type of crises over countries, time and
month. The dating dummies are used in binary choice models that explain the probability
of crises. Section 4 describes our set of indicators, and presents and discusses our main
results, both of the factor analysis and the binomial multivariate logit models for each type
of crises and variety of currency crises. Furthermore, we analyze the performance of the
models in an in-sample experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature
The list of studies on EWS of ﬁnancial crises is long and expanding rapidly. A full list
is beyond the scope of this paper.3 Typically, an EWS has an empirical structure with
indicators that contribute to a country’s vulnerability to a future crisis and forecasts the
likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis. EWS models differ widely in terms of the deﬁnition of
ﬁnancial crisis, the time span on which the EWS is estimated and attempts to forecast,
the selection of indicators, and the statistical or econometric method. This section begins
with a discussion of how to measure and date ﬁnancial crises. Thereafter we examine a
2. The literature that focuses on contagion usually dates currency crises on the base of some ‘events’ like the
Russia or the Asia crisis. Examples are Forbes and Rigobon (2002) or Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
3. Interested readers are referred to Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) for papers on currency crises
prior to the East Asian crisis, and Bustelo (2000) and Burkart and Coudert (2002) on the East Asian crisis;
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996) and Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) on banking crises; and Marchesi
(2003)’s survey on debt crisis.
3selection of empirical studies on ﬁnancial crisis, focusing on ﬁnancial crises indicators,
the most important issue in the construction of an EWS.
2.1 Measuring and dating ﬁnancial crises
2.1.1 Currency crises
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) made an important early effort to develop
a method to measure currency pressure and to date currency crises. Their deﬁnition of
exchange rate pressure is inspired by the monetary model of Girton and Roper (1977).
The exchange rate is under pressure if the value of a constructed index exceeds a certain
threshold. The index consists of weighted relative changes of the nominal exchange rate,
international reserve and interest rates to capture successful as well as unsuccessful spec-
ulative attacks. All variables in their index are relative to a reference country and their
threshold is time-independent.
The method of Eichengreen et al. was heavily criticized which led to alternatives based
on the same methodology. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) followed the concept of Eichengreen et al. fairly closely, but they ex-
cluded interest rate differentials from their index since interest rates were controlled by
central banks in their sample, the 1970s and 1980s, and comparisons to a reference coun-
try. In this paper we analyze two other alternatives. The ﬁrst excludes unsuccessful attacks
from the index, since these are hard to detect. Frankel and Rose (1996)—and Esquivel
and Larrain (1998)—drop international reserves and interest rates differentials from the
exchange rate pressure index and construct a currency crash index. The second takes the
volatility of variables in the currency crisis explicitly into account. Zhang (2001) deﬁnes
time-dependent thresholds to handle this problem.
2.1.2 Banking crises
The deﬁnition of banking crises is less precise than the deﬁnition of a currency crisis
and hence more difﬁcult to implement. Recent studies on banking crises show important
differences regarding crisis episodes. The most-cited studies for dating banking crises are
the following:
• Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) start from a sample of 69 countries for which infor-
mation on bank insolvencies is available since the mid-1970s to 1998. An episode
of a systemic banking crisis is identiﬁed if a country experiences an erosion of bank
capital and estimated costs of resolving the crisis are high. Their data is based on
published sources and interviews with country economists.
• Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) draw a distinction between banking crisis (sys-
temic episodes) and banking problems, deﬁned as ”signiﬁcant extensive unsound-
ness short of crisis” (localized crises or non-systemic episodes). Banking crisis re-
fer to evidence of bank runs or other substantial portfolio reallocations, collapsing
4ﬁnancial ﬁrms, or massive government intervention. Their list of banking problems
includes episodes from 1980 to mid-1996 and covers 181 IMF-member countries.
• Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) deﬁne a banking crisis as an episode of
banking distress in which the ratio of non-performing assets to total bank assets
exceeds 10 percent and the costs of rescue operations exceed 2 percent of GDP.
Banking crises are also frequently identiﬁed by events such as bank failure, large
scalebanknationalization,depositfreezes,prolongedbankholidaysandbankshut-
downs or mergers. They use a sample of 65 countries from 1980 to 1995.
• Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) mark the start of banking crises by events that point
at (i) bank runs that lead to closure, merger or takeovers by the public sector of one
or more ﬁnancial institutions, or (ii) a large-scale government bail-out of one or
more ﬁnancial institutions that is followed by more bail-outs. A banking crisis ends
when government assistance stops. Their sample has 20 countries for the period of
1970-1995.
The ﬁrst three studies specify both the beginning and the end of crises on an annual basis,
but Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) list the start of the crisis at a monthly frequency. All
of these studies register events for crisis dates, except Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache
(1997) who try to include quantitative measures. However, some measurement problems
exist. First, central bank quasi-ﬁscal operations for rescue purposes are difﬁcult to quan-
tify. In some respects, this is simply because central bank accounting conventions differ
from those of government and the distinction between monetary and ﬁscal activities of the
central bank is blurred. Secondly, the main banking problems observed in recent years do
not stem from the liabilities side of bank balance sheets. Since the introduction of deposit
insurance, it is no longer possible to date a banking crisis on the basis of changes in bank
deposits. As banking crises generally arise from the assets side of banks’ balance sheets,
indicators such as changes in prices in the real estate sector and non-performing assets are
becoming more and more important. Unfortunately, both indicators are not available in a
timely manner.
2.1.3 Debt crises
Sincetheonsetofdebtcrisesinthe1980sand1990s,anextensivetheoreticalandempirical
literature has dealt with the determinants of sovereign default and sovereign risk. All of
these studies have in common that they start from a deﬁnition of a debt crisis or a debt
service difﬁculty or default. Typically, the incidence of a debt crisis is interpreted as a debt
rescheduling agreement or negotiation, arrears (amounts past due and unpaid) on principal
repayments or interest payments and an upper-tranche IMF agreement.
Some papers use combinations of debt crisis deﬁnitions, others simply make use of single
events or measurement of either debt rescheduling or arrears. For instance Berg and Sachs
(1988), Lee (1991), Balkan (1992), Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996), and Marchesi (2003),
have a common deﬁnition of a debt crisis using only the concept of debt rescheduling. All
studies aim at picking out years in which countries reschedule their external debt. Broadly
speaking, debt rescheduling is deﬁned as a mechanism whereby the debtors offer the cred-
5itors (commercial banks and governments of industrial countries) a revised contract that
enables debtors not to default on their loans. The contract arrangements include an actual
reduction of the principal and service of the debt and the postponement of payment. 4
The approach of McFadden et al. (1985) and Hajivassiliou (1989,1994) comprises all three
elements in their debt default deﬁnition. They consider the presence of arrears on interest
or principal as an additional expression of a debt servicing problem. Overall, they deﬁne
a country as experiencing a debt crisis in a given year if (i) there is an event of debt
rescheduling with commercial or ofﬁcial creditors, (ii) an upper-tranche IMF agreement
is underway, or (iii) the amount of accumulated arrears on interest payments or principal
repayments exceeds some minimum threshold.
2.2 Indicators of ﬁnancial crises
The empirical studies summarized in Table 1 share the idea that it is possible to identify
a number of domestic and external macroeconomic fundamental indicators as the main
determinants of a ﬁnancial crisis. Some explanatory variables are exclusive for currency
crises, banking crises or debt crises; others are informative for more than one type of crisis.
The ﬁrst two columns in the table list the indicator and a brief summary of its economic
interpretation. The next three columns report the hypothesized sign of each indicator; a
plus (minus) sign indicates that a high (low) value of the indicator reﬂects a high ﬁnancial
crisis probability. The ﬁnal column list(s) the reference(s).
Seven variables are grouped as external sector indicators, ﬁve of which are related to the
current account and two to the capital account. These variables are certainly affected not
only by domestic economic conditions and policies, but also by global conditions such
as ﬂuctuations in the US dollar, international capital ﬂows and commodity prices. The
second group contains 16 indicators, nine ﬁnancial indicators and seven domestic real-
public variables (7 indicators) that are partly or fully driven by economic policy. Finally,
three global indicators reﬂect major economic shifts in industrial countries and movements
of oil prices which may trigger a crisis. Some indicators are multiple crises indicators in
the sense that the same indicator hints at more than one type of ﬁnancial crises. However,
it is not sure whether such a multiple crises indicator affects the probability of two or
more types of ﬁnancial crises simultaneously, or whether it triggers one type of crisis
which in turn rolls over to a second type of crisis, and a third. For instance, a drop in
international competitiveness may result in a currency crises as a result of which a banking
crises evolves. Our model allows for one indicator to affect two or more types of crises.
However, the rollover effect is not captured explicitly.
4. Hajivassiliou (1987) and Li (1992) add the upper-tranche IMF agreement to their debt crisis deﬁnition. See
IMF (2001) for details on the upper-tranche agreement.
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Indicator Interpretation CC BC DC Reference(s)
External sector (current account)
Real exchange
rate
A measure for the change in international competitiveness and a
proxy for over(under)valuation. Overvalued real exchange rate is
expected to produce higher probability of ﬁnancial crisis.
+ + Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Kamin
et al. (2001); Edison
(2003); Dermirg¨ uc ¸-
Kunt and Detragiache
(2000); Eichengreen
and Arteta (2000)
Export growth An indicator for a loss of competitiveness in international good
market. Declining export growth may be caused by an overvalued
domestic currency and hence a proxy for currency overvaluation.
On the other hand, if export growth slows due to reasons unrelated
to the exchange rate, this may cause devaluation pressure. In both
cases, declining export growth can be a leading indicator for a size-
able devaluation.
- - Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and
Pattillo (1999); Edi-
son (2003); Marchesi
(2003)
Import growth Weak external sector is part of currency crises. Enormous import
growth could lead to worsening in the current account and have
been often related with currency crises.
+ Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
Terms of trade Increases in terms of trade should strengthen a country’s balance of
payments position and hence lower the probability of crisis. Terms
of trade deteriorations may precede currency crisis.
- - - Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Kamin
et al. (2001); Der-
mirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (2000);
Lanoie and Lemarbre
(1996)
Ratio of the cur-
rent account to
GDP
A rise in this ratio is generally associated with large external capi-
tal inﬂows that are intermediated by the domestic ﬁnancial system
and could facilitate asset price and credit booms. Increases in the
current account surplus are expected to indicate a diminished prob-
ability to devalue and thus to lower the probability of a crisis.
- - - Berg and Pattillo
(1999); Kamin et al.
(2001); Eichengreen
and Arteta (2000);
Lanoie and Lemarbre
(1996); Marchesi
(2003)
External sector (capital account)
Ratio of M2 to
foreign exchange
reserves
Captures to what extent the liabilities of the banking system are
backed by foreign reserves. In the event of a currency crisis, indi-
viduals may rush to convert their domestic currency deposits into
foreign currency, so that this ratio captures the ability of the central
bank to meet their demands.
+ + Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Kamin
et al. (2001); Edison
(2003); Dermirg¨ uc ¸-
Kunt and Detragiache
(2000); Eichengreen
and Arteta (2000)
Growth of for-
eign exchange re-
serves
Declining foreign reserves is a reliable indicator that a currency is
under devaluation pressure. A drop in reserves is not necessarily
followed by devaluation, central bank may be successful in defend-
ing a peg, spending large amounts of reserves in the process. On
the other hand, most currency collapses are preceded by a period of
increased efforts to defend the exchange rate, which are marked by
declining foreign reserves. Total value of foreign reserves are also
used as indicators of a country’s ﬁnancial difﬁculty dealing with
debt repayment.
- - Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and
Pattillo (1999); Edi-
son (2003); Marchesi
(2003)
to be continued
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Indicator Interpretation CC BC DC Reference(s)
Financial sector
M1 and M2
growth
These indicators are measures of liquidity. High growth of these in-
dicators might indicate excess liquidity which may fuel speculative
attacks on the currency thus leading to a currency crisis.
+ Kamin et al. (2001)
M2 money multi-
plier
An indicator associated with ﬁnancial liberalization. Large in-
creases in the money multiplier can be explained by draconian re-
ductions in reserve requirements.
+ Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
Ratio of domestic
credit to GDP
Very high growth of domestic credit may serve as a crude indicator
of the fragility of the banking system. This ratio usually rises in
the early phase of the banking crisis. It may be that as the crisis
unfolds, the central bank may be injecting money to the bank to
improve their ﬁnancial situation.
+ + Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003); Dermirg¨ uc ¸-
Kunt and Detragiache
(2000); Eichengreen
and Arteta (2000)
Excess real M1
balance
Loose monetary policy can lead to currency crisis. + Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
Domestic real in-
terest rate
Real interest rate can be considered as proxy of ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion, in which the liberalization process itself tends to lead to high
real rates. High real interest rates signal a liquidity crunch or have
been increased to fend off a speculative attack.
+ + Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003); Dermirg¨ uc ¸-
Kunt and Detragiache
(2000)
Lending and de-
posit rate spread
An increase of this indicator above some threshold level possibly
reﬂects a deterioration in credit risk as banks are unwilling to lend
or decline in loan quality.
+ Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
Commercial bank
deposits
Domestic bank run and capital ﬂight occur as crisis unfolds. - Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
Ratio of bank re-
serves to bank as-
sets
Adverse macroeconomic shocks are less likely to lead to crises in
countries where the banking system is liquid.
- Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997)
Domestic real and public sector
Ratio of ﬁscal
balance to GDP
Higher deﬁcits are expected to raise the probability of crisis, since
the deﬁcits increase the vulnerability to shocks and investor’s con-
ﬁdence.
+ Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (2000);
Eichengreen and
Arteta (2000)
Ratio of public
debt to GDP
Higher indebtedness is expected to raise vulnerability to a reversal
in capital inﬂows and hence to raise the probability of a crisis.
+ + + Kamin et al., (2001);
Lanoie and Lemarbre
(1996); Eichengreen
and Arteta (2000)
Growth of indus-
trial production
Recessions often precede ﬁnancial crises. - Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
Changes in stock
prices
Burst of asset price bubbles often precede ﬁnancial crises. - Kaminsky et al.
(1998); Berg and Pat-
tillo (1999); Edison
(2003)
to be continued
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Indicator Interpretation CC BC DC Reference(s)
Domestic real and public sector continued
Inﬂation rate The inﬂation rate is likely to be associated with high nominal in-
terest rates and may proxy macroeconomic mismanagement which
adversely affects the economy and the banking system.
+ + Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997);
Lanoie and Lemarbre
(1996); Marchesi
(2003)
GDP per capita High income countries may be less likely to reschedule their debt
than poorer countries since the costs of rescheduling would tend to
be more onerous for more advanced economies. Deterioration of
the domestic economic activity are expected to increase the likeli-
hood of a banking crisis.
- - Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997);
Eichengreen and
Arteta (2000); Lanoie
and Lemarbre (1996);
Marchesi (2003)
National saving
growth
High national savings may be expected to lower the probability of
debt rescheduling.
- Lanoie and Lemarbre
(1996)
Global economy
Growth of world
oil prices
High oil prices are associated with recessions. + Edison (2003)
US interest rate International interest rate increases are often associated with capital
outﬂows.
+ + Edison (2003); Kamin
et al. (2001); Eichen-
green and Arteta
(2000)
OECD GDP
growth
Higher foreign output growth should strengthen exports and thus
reduce the probability of a crisis.
- - Edison (2003); Kamin
et al. (2001); Eichen-
green and Arteta
(2000)
Notes: CC, BC and DC represent currency crisis, banking crisis, and debt crisis, respectively.
Positive (negative) expected sign means that a high (low) value of the indicator causes a higher probability of a crisis.
9Table 2 gives an overview of the empirical results of most of the papers on ﬁnancial crises.
The empirical papers deal with single crises only and differ in the types of analysis: signal
extraction models and qualitative response models. Also the time span and the frequency
of the data and the number of countries included in the analysis differs. Some papers use
a short time span and cover a lot of countries—especially Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996)—
while others cover a longer time span at the expense of a smaller country coverage.
Berg and Pattillo (1999) and Edison (2003) use the same set of currency crisis indicators
as Kaminsky et al. (1998) apart from global economy indicators which are included to
capture external shocks. All studies show that real exchange rates, export growth, and
the ratio of M2 to international reserves are the most important indicators to explain the
probability of currency crises.
Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) consider the role of macroeconomic variables,
deposit insurance and law enforcement in determining the likelihood of banking failure.
They observe that the risk of a banking crisis becomes higher the lower output growth
and the higher inﬂation, the domestic real interest rate, the ratio of M2 to international
reserve, and domestic credit per GDP. Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) ﬁnd that domestic
credit booms and government ﬁscal balance are strongly associated with banking crises.
The most recent study on the probability of debt crises, Marchesi (2003) concludes that
none of the indicators listed in Table 2 is signiﬁcant. This result is not supported by Lanoie
and Lemarbre (1996). They observe that the lower the rate of growth of GDP per capita
and the large external capital inﬂows, the higher the probability of debt rescheduling and
debt crises.
10Table 2: Explanatory variables: empirics
KLR(1998) BP(1999) KSS(2001) E(2003) DKD(2000) EA(2000) LL(1996) M(2003)
Indicator CC CC CC CC BC BC DC DC
External sector (current account)
Real exchange rate ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ◦ ◦
Export growth ∗ ∗ ∗ ◦
Import growth ◦ ◦ ◦
Terms of trade ◦ ◦ ∗ ◦ ◦
Ratio of the current account to
GDP
∗ ∗ ◦ ∗ ◦
External sector (capital account)
Ratio of M2 to foreign ex-
change reserves
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ◦
Growth of foreign exchange re-
serves
◦ ∗ ◦ ◦
Financial sector
M1 and M2 growth ∗
M2 money multiplier ◦ ◦ ◦
Ratio of domestic credit to
GDP
◦ ◦ ◦ ∗ ∗
Excess real M1 balance ◦ ◦ ◦
Domestic real interest rate ◦ ◦ ◦ ∗
Lending and deposit rate
spread
◦ ◦ ◦
Commercial bank deposits ◦ ◦ ◦
Ratio of bank reserves to bank
assets
◦
Domestic real and public sector
Ratio of ﬁscal balance to GDP ◦ ∗
Ratio of public debt to GDP ∗ ◦ ◦
Growth of industrial produc-
tion
∗ ◦ ◦
Changes in stock prices ∗ ◦ ◦
Inﬂation rates ∗ ◦ ◦
GDP per capita ∗ ◦ ∗ ◦
National saving growth ◦
Global economy
Growth of world oil prices ◦
US interest rate ∗ ◦ ◦
OECD GDP growth ∗ ◦ ◦
Observations 1970-1995 1970-1996 1981-1999 1970-1999 1980-1995 1975-1997 1989-1990 1983-1996
Frequency monthly monthly monthly monthly annual annual annual annual
Method Signal Probit Probit Signal Logit Probit Probit Probit
Country coverage 20 23 26 28 65 78 93 87
Notes: CC, BC and DC represent currency crisis, banking crisis, and debt crisis, respectively.
The mark ◦ and ∗ denote insigniﬁcant and signiﬁcant indicators, respectively. The papers included in this table are KLR:
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998); BP: Berg and Pattillo (1999); KSS: Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001); E: Edi-
son (2003); DKD: Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2000); EA: Eichengreen and Arteta (2000); LL: Lanoie and Lemar-
bre (1996); M: Marchesi (2003).
113. Dating ﬁnancial crisis
3.1 Currency crises
In this paper, we identify episodes of currency crisis in East Asia using four methods. In
the ﬁrst method, we adopt the complete concept of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995)
in the construction of our exchange rate market pressure index. For the dating of currency
crises we set the exchange market pressure index threshold to two standard deviations
from the mean.5 The results of this method are compared to three alternative methods:
without country reference (based on Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998), excluding
unsuccessfulattacks(asproposedbyFrankelandRose,1996),andtime-varyingthresholds
(following Zhang, 2001). Details are provided below.
Currency crises dating, method ERW
Eichengreen et al. assume that a speculative attack only exists in the form of extreme
pressure in the foreign exchange market, which usually results in a devaluation (or reval-
uation), or a change in the exchange rate system, i.e. to ﬂoat, ﬁx or widen the band of the
exchange rate. However, speculative attacks on exchange rates can also be unsuccessful.
When facing pressure on its currency, the authorities have the option to raise interest rates
or to run down international reserves. Hence, speculative pressure is measured by an index
that is a weighted average of normalized changes in the exchange rate, the ratio of gross
international reserves to M1, and the nominal interest rates. All variables are relative to a
reference country, for which a country is selected with a strong currency that serves as an
anchor to other countries. We use the US as our reference country. The index of exchange
rate pressure is deﬁned as follows:
EMPIi,t =
1
σe
1ei,t
ei,t
−
1
σr

1rmi,t
rmi,t
−
1rmUS,t
rmUS,t

+
1
σi
1
 
ii,t − iUS,t

, (1)
where EMPIi,t is the exchange rate market pressure index for country i in period t; ei,t
the units of country i’s currency per US dollars in period t; rmi,t the ratio of gross for-
eign reserves to M1 for country i in period t, ii,t the nominal interest rates for coun-
try i in period t; iUS,t the nominal interest rates for the reference country (US) in pe-
riod t; σe the standard deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate
 
1ei,t/ei,t

,
σr is the standard deviation of the difference between the relative changes in the ra-
tio of foreign reserves and money (M1) in country i and the reference country (US)   
1ri,t/ri,t

−
 
1rmUS,t/rmUS,t

, and σi the standard deviation of the nominal interest
rate differential 1(ii,t − iUS,t).
This measure is intuitively appealing. In case of speculative pressure, the index captures
changes in the domestic exchange rate if the attack is successful and changes in interna-
tional reserves or nominal interest rates if the speculative attack does not lead to a deval-
5. See Lestano and Jacobs (2002) for a sensitivity analysis of the dating scheme to different values of the
threshold. Moreover, threshold models are also sensitive to the time period considered (see also Dungey et al.,
2003).
12uation. A period of speculative attack is identiﬁed when the index exceeds some upper
bound:
Crisis =

1 if EMPIi,t > βσEMPI + µEMPI
0 otherwise,
where σEMPI equals the sample standard deviation of EMPI and µEMPI is the sample
mean of EMPI. We arbitrarily set a threshold of β = 2, i.e. two standard deviations above
the mean.
Currency crises dating, method KLR
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) modify the exchange market pressure index of
Equation (1) by dropping the links to the reference country and multiplying the right-
hand-side by the standard deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate:
EMPIi,t =
1ei,t
ei,t
−
σe
σr
1ri,t
ri,t
+
σe
σi
1ii,t, (2)
where EMPIi,t is again the exchange rate market pressure index for country i in period t ,
ei,t the units of country i’s currency per US dollars in period t,ri,t gross foreign reserves of
country i in period t, ii,t the nominal interest rates for country i in period t, σe the standard
deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate 1ei,t/ei,t, σr the standard deviation of
the relative change in the reserves
 
1ri,t/ri,t

, and σi the standard deviation of the change
in the nominal interest rate 1ii,t.
To avoid the problem that currency crises are associated with high inﬂation, the sample is
split into periods with hyperinﬂation and low inﬂation; separate indexes are constructed
for each subsample. Contrary to their implementation, we include interest rates from the
index. The deﬁnition of a currency crisis is the same as in ERW.
Currency crises dating, method FR
Frankel and Rose (1996) exclude unsuccessful speculative attacks from the exchange rate
pressure concept. In their opinion international reserves are too rough a proxy to mea-
sure policy actions in defense of the currency. In addition, they argue that raising interest
rates and exhausting international reserves is not standard practice to deal with speculative
attack in most of the developing countries.
Our implementation of the Frankel and Rose (1996) method uses only nominal exchange
rate variables and deﬁnes a currency crash as a nominal depreciation of the currency of
at least 25 percent which is accompanied by an increase in the rate of depreciation of at
least a 10 percent. The latter cut-off point is used to avoid registering periods with high
inﬂation, which are usually followed by high depreciation. So, a currency crash is deﬁned
as
Crisis =

1 if %1ei,t > 25% and %1ei,t > 10% + %1ei,t−1
0 otherwise
(3)
13Currency crises dating, method Z
Zhang (2001) criticized Eichengreen et al.’s exchange market pressure by pointing at two
problems. First, changes in international reserves and interest rates may cancel against
each other if the speculative attack is successful. For example, a positive change in the
exchange rate (in anticipation of a devaluation) may trigger a fall in the interest rate and
an increase in international reserves. Secondly, movements in international reserves and
exchange rate can be volatile in some periods and relatively tranquil in other periods.
Thus, an event that results in high volatility dominates the whole sample.
To tackle both problems, Zhang suggested decomposing Eichengreen et al.’s exchange
rate market pressure index into its components and to use time-varying thresholds for each
component. Zhang (2001) excludes interest rate variables and also drops the link to the
reference country. However, we retain the interest rate differential in our index.
Crisis =

  
  
1 if



1ei,t/ei,t > β1σe,t + µe,t or
1ri,t/ri,t < β2σr,t + µr,t or
1ii,t > β3σi,t + µi,t
0 otherwise
(4)
where ei,t = units of country i currency per U.S. dollars at period t, ri,t = ratio of gross
foreign reserves to M1 for country i at period t, ii,t = interest rates for country i at period
t, σe,t = standard deviation of
 
1ei,t/ei,t

in the sample of (t − 36,t − 1), σr,t = standard
deviation of
 
1ri,t/ri,t

in the sample of (t − 36,t − 1), and σi,t = standard deviation of
1ii,t in the sample of (t − 36,t − 1). We arbitrarily set the thresholds to β1 = β3 = 2 and
β2 = −2.
3.2 Banking crises
The list of banking crisis events provided by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) is very com-
prehensive in terms of providing information of banking crises on a monthly basis. Nev-
ertheless, we use additional sources to complete our entire sample from January 1970 to
December 2001, and also to include countries that are not covered in Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1999), i.e. Singapore and South Korea. To date additional events, we rely heavily on
the correspondence with central banks, IMF country reports and various ﬁnancial publica-
tions. Table 3 provides information on the East Asia banking crisis dates and gives a brief
description of the events.
14Table 3: Banking crisis events
Country Date Event
Indonesia November 1992 Alargebank(BankSumma)collapsesandtriggersrunsonthreesmaller
banks.
November 1997 The government liquidated 16 commercial banks.
December 1997 Bank of Indonesia (central bank) supports commercial bank liquidity
amounted 5 % of GDP.
January 1998 The government guaranteed all customer deposit both in private and
state banks, except for international banks.
April 1998 The government closed seven private national banks: Bank Surya, Bank
Subentra, Bank Istismarat, Bank Pelita, Bank Hokindo, Bank Deka, dan
Bank Centris.
May 1998 Bank Central Asia is taken over by the government. Bank Nusa Interna-
sional, Bank Angkasa, and Bank Nasional Komersial merged with Bank
Nasional.
August 1998 The government closed three private national banks: Bank Umum Na-
sional, Bank Modern, dan Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia. At the
same time, the government took over three private banks : Bank Dana-
mon, Bank Central Asia, Bank PDFCI, dan Bank Tiara Asia. Three pri-
vate banks, Bank Jaya International, Bank Artamedia and Bank Ciputra,
merged with Bank Mashill.
October 1998 Four government-owned banks, Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Bumi
Daya,BankPembangunanIndonesia,andBankExim,weremergedinto
Bank Mandiri (new entity).
March 1999 The government closed 38 private national banks.
June 2000 Bank Danamon merged with 8 other private national banks.
October 2000 The government closed two national private banks, Bank Prasidha
Utama and Bank Ratu.
September 2002 The government merged ﬁve national banks: Bank Bali, Bank Univer-
sal, Bank Patriot, Bank Prima Express, and Bank Artha Media.
Malaysia July 1985 Runs against some branches of a large domestic bank, following the
collapse of a related bank in Hongkong.
September 1998 Bank Bumiputra Berhad merged with Commerce Asset Holding (Bank
of Commerce).
November 1998 Merger between Perwire Afﬁn Bank and BSN Commercial Bank.
February 1999 Merger between (i) Bank of Commerce and Bank Bumiputra, and (ii)
Danamodal Nasional Investment with Arab Malaysian Bank, Arab-
Malaysian Merchant Bank, BSN Commercial Bank, and Oriental Bank.
July 1999 Ban Hin Lee Bank merged with Southern Bank.
August 1999 15 ﬁnance companies have been merged.
December 2000 54 banks were merged into ten groups.
Philippines January 1981 Commercial paper market collapse, triggering bank runs and the failure
on non-bank ﬁnancial institutions and thrift banks.
July 1985 One commercial bank was closed.
October 1998 One commercial bank was closed.
to be continued
15(Table 3 continued)
Country Date Event
December 1998 Philippine Bank of Communications merged with Asian Bank Corpo-
ration.
March 1999 One small commercial bank (the Prime Savings Bank) was closed on
account of bankruptcy.
May 1999 the PCI Bank merged with Equitable Banking Corporation.
October 1999 Bank of the Philippine Islands and Far East Bank merged to become the
largest bank in the country.
April 2000 Urban Bank was closed by the authorities.
Thailand January 1979 Following the stock market crash, one of the largest companies failed.
The bail-out of the ﬁnancial sector began.
October 1983 Large losses in a ﬁnance company lead to runs and government inter-
vention.
July 1997 42 ﬁnancial companies suspended.
June 1997 Signiﬁcant consolidation in the ﬁnancial sector. Seven banks have been
merged and bailed-out.
November 1997 56 ﬁnance companies were closed.
August 1998 Union Bank was integrated with Krungthai Thanakit. First Bangkok
City Bank was integrated with Krung Thai Bank. Laem Thong Bank
is integrated with Radanasin Bank and privatized.
April 1999 Union Bank was integrated with twelve ﬁnance companies.
December 2000 Further consolidation in the ﬁnancial sector.
March 2002 Siam City Bank and Bangkok Metropolitan Bank are merged.
December 2002 One ﬁnancial company (Thanapat Credit Foncier) is closed.
South Korea January 1997 Monetary authority introduced a insurance deposit which fully covered
all deposit not exceeding 20 million Won per depositor.
September 1997 Central bank provide liquidity support to merchant banks and Korean
First Bank.
November 1997 The government announces that it guarantees all foreign liabilities of
ﬁnancial institutions, and provides liquidity to support private banks.
December 1997 Further liquidity support to commercial banks and other ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. Two commercial banks, Korean First Bank and Seoul Bank,
were taken over by government.
January 1998 The government closed 10 insolvent merchant banks.
July 1998 Five small banks with negative capital ratios were closed by the govern-
ment.
August 1998 Merger between Boram Bank and Hana Bank Merger, and between
Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank.
September 1998 Merger between Kookmin Bank and Long-term Credit Bank and be-
tween Boram Bank and Hana Bank.
December 1998 Merger between Kangwon Bank and Cho Hung Bank.
January 1999 Merger of undercapitalized banks, Commercial Bank and Hanil Bank,
into large government-owned bank, Hanvit Bank.
May 1999 Merger between Cho Hung Bank and Chung Bak Bank
August 1999 242 non-bank ﬁnancial institutions in weak ﬁnancial conditions had to
stop their operations as ordered by the government.
Singapore July 98 Post Ofﬁce Savings Bank merged with DBS Bank.
August 1998 Tat Lee Bank merged with Keppel Bank.
163.3 Debt crises
Since World Bank data on interest and principal arrears are on an annual basis, we con-
centrated on debt rescheduling events for our debt crisis dating.
Table 4: Debt rescheduling events
Country Date Rescheduling type
Indonesia December 1966 Ofﬁcial and non-ofﬁcial debt are rescheduled at the appropriate
market rate with a repayment proﬁle negotiated on a case-by-case
basis.
October 1967 Idem
October 1968 Idem
April 1970 Idem
June 1998 Agreement on a framework for restructuring USD 80.23 billion of
private debt.
September 1998 Treatment of maturities falling due from August 06, 1998 up to
March 31, 2000.
April 2000 Non-ofﬁcialdebtarerescheduledattheappropriatemarketrateover
around15yearswith2-3yearsgraceandprogressivepaymentsrais-
ing year by year. Ofﬁcial debt are rescheduled at an interest rate at
least as favorable as the original concessional interest rate apply-
ing to these loans, over 20 years with a maximum 10-year grace.
Repayment terms also include the possibility for creditor countries
to conduct, on a bilateral and voluntary basis, debt swaps with the
debtor country.
April 2002 Idem
Philippines December 1984 Debt rescheduling amounted USD 936 million.
May 1985 Commercial debt rescheduling amounted USD 5,885 million.
January 1986 Idem
January 1987 Debt restructuring with USD 988 million consolidation amount.
December 1987 Debt rescheduling amounted USD 9,010 million.
May 1989 Debt restructuring with USD 1,642 million consolidation amount.
January 1990 Debt rescheduling amounted USD 1,337 million of buy back at a 50
percent discount.
February 1990 Debt restructuring with USD 781 million consolidation amount.
June 1991 Debt restructuring with USD 1,682 million consolidation amount.
July 1992 Following implementation of a cash buy back of USD 1,3 billion on
May, 1992.
December 1992 Following implementation of a cash buy back of USD 1,3 billion on
May, 1992.
July 1994 Debt restructuring with USD 586 million consolidation amount.
September 1996 Voluntary debt swap.
October 1999 Voluntary debt swap.
South Korea January 1998 Restructuring the short-term foreign debts owed foreign commer-
cial banks.
17The debt default refers to the condition that a country pursues commercial bank reschedul-
ing with commercial borrowers as deﬁned by the IMF and the World Bank. Commercial
borrowers are deﬁned as those developing countries for which at least one third of foreign
borrowing is from private sector creditors. In this study, we also included debt problems
that led to rescheduling of the ofﬁcial debt in the Paris Club,6 debt equity swap and volun-
tary buybacks. Table 4 lists debt rescheduling events in our sample. No debt crises occur
in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
3.4 Financial crises: distribution over countries and time
Table 5 summarizes the distribution of the ﬁnancial crises over the countries in our sample
of six Asian countries. Currency crises are distributed more or less evenly over the six
countries. Banking crises are relative rare for Singapore, a country with a more advanced
banking system. Debt crises occur most frequently in Philippines, Indonesia coming sec-
ond. With respect to the currency crisis deﬁnitions, the FR method signals most currency
crises (nearly 35% of the months for all countries). ERW and KLR produce more or less
the same number of currency crises (around 2.5% of the months). Zhang’s deﬁnition with
time-varying thresholds produces nearly 4 times as much currency crises as ERW and
KLR.
Table 5: Financial crises: distribution over countries
Currency crises
ERW KLR FR Z Banking crises Debt crises
Indonesia 10 (2.60%) 9 (2.34%) 110 (28.65%) 44 (11.46%) 11 (2.86%) 4 (1.04%)
Malaysia 10 (2.60%) 10 (2.60%) 156 (40.63%) 31 (8.07%) 7 (1.82%) 0 (0.00%)
Philippines 10 (2.60%) 12 (3.13%) 141 (36.72%) 52 (13.54%) 8 (2.08%) 14 (3.65%)
Singapore 14 (3.65%) 11 (2.86%) 162 (42.19%) 33 (8.59%) 2 (0.52%) 0 (0.00%)
South Korea 7 (1.82%) 7 (1.82%) 121 (31.51%) 27 (7.03%) 12 (3.13%) 1 (0.26%)
Thailand 9 (2.34%) 9 (2.34%) 111 (28.91%) 22 (5.73%) 8 (2.08%) 0 (0.00%)
All countries 60 (2.60%) 58 (2.52%) 801 (34.77%) 209 (9.07%) 48 (2.08%) 19 (0.82%)
Notes: ERW, KLR, FR, and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, respectively.
The number between parentheses shows the frequency of crisis occurrence which is calculated by dividing the
total number of crisis months by the total number of observations.
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the ﬁnancial crises for each country. Currency
crises for all countries tend to be evenly distributed over time. Episodes of banking crises
occur more frequently during 1990s, probably due to the intensive ﬁnancial liberalization
6. The Paris Club is an informal group of ofﬁcial creditors (19 countries) whose role is to ﬁnd co-ordinated
and sustainable solutions to the payment difﬁculties experienced by debtor nations. Paris Club creditors agree
to rescheduling debts due to them. Rescheduling is a means of providing a country with debt relief through
a postponement and, in the case of concessional rescheduling, a reduction in debt service obligations (see
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/).
18Table 6: Financial crises: distribution over the months of the year
Currency crises
ERW KLR FR Z Banking crises Debt crises
January 18 9 68 23 6 4
February 3 3 71 14 1 1
March 4 3 59 19 2 0
April 0 1 78 12 3 2
May 3 2 57 10 3 2
June 2 3 64 14 2 2
July 6 7 69 18 6 2
August 3 5 69 21 6 0
September 5 6 65 17 3 2
October 7 7 64 17 5 1
November 2 5 72 19 5 0
December 7 7 65 25 6 3
Total 60 58 801 209 48 19
Notes: ERW, KLR, FR, and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, respectively.
in these economies in the 1980s. As noted, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand did not
experience debt crises. For the other three countries, debt repayment difﬁculties became
more frequent after currency and banking crises hit these countries during the 1990s.
Table 6 lists the distribution of the ﬁnancial crises over the months of the year. There
seems to be a January-effect in the ﬁnancial crises data. January has the maximum number
of crisis observations for ERW, KLR, bank and debt crises. Below we will test if this type
of time effect is picked up in the estimations.
Since each method adopts a different deﬁnition of exchange rate market pressure, judging
which dating system identiﬁes currency crises is best is not trivial.7 Therefore we include
all currency crises dating schemes in our EWS.
7. Edison (2003) and Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (2001) reach a similar conclusion.
19Figure 1: Financial crises in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines: distribution over time
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20Figure 2: Financial crises in Singapore, South Korea and Thailand: distribution over time
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214. Estimation results
As already mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to construct a model
that calculates the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis. To do so we use a binomial multivariate
qualitative response approach. The set of economic indicators that may contain informa-
tion on whether or not a crises will occur is huge (cf. Table 1). It is not feasible to include
all indicators in the logit model, so ﬁrst we reduce the information set into a limited num-
ber of factors using factor analysis. These factors are then used as explanatory variables in
the logit model.
4.1 Factor analysis
Technically speaking, factor analysis transforms a set of random variables linearly and
orthogonally into new random variables.8 The ﬁrst factor is the normalized linear combi-
nation of the original set of random variables with maximum variance; The second factor
is the normalized linear combination with maximum variance of all linear combinations
uncorrelated with the ﬁrst factor; and so on. By construction factors are uncorrelated. The
eigenvalue for a given factor measures the variance in all the variables which is accounted
for by that factor. If a factor has a low eigenvalue, then it may be ignored. Other factors
are more important in explaining the variances in the set of variables under consideration.
Because the factors often do not have economic meaning we cluster the indicators into
four groups and perform factor analysis to each of the groups separately. The downside of
this method is that it is not ruled out that factors from different groups are correlated.
There is no ”best” criterion for dropping the least important factors. The so-called Kaiser
criterion drops all factors with eigenvalues below one. The Cattell scree test is a graphical
method in which the eigenvalues are plotted on the vertical axis and the factors on the
horizontal axis. The test suggests to select the number of factors that corresponds to the
place of the curve where the smooth decrease of eigenvalues appears to level off to the
right of the plot. In this paper we—in principal—use the scree test, but do not want too
large a number of factors because of the problem of multicollinearity discussed above.
The main source of all data is the International Financial Statistics of the IMF for the
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial indicators and the World Bank Development Indicators for
thedebtvariables.Weusemonthlydata,coveringsixAsiancountries,Indonesia,Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, from January 1977 to the end of 2001.
Missing data are supplemented from Advance/Datastream and various reports of the coun-
try’s central bank. All data in local currency units are converted into US dollars. Some
annual indicators are interpolated to obtain a complete monthly database.
This study focuses on indicators of macroeconomic development and external shocks.
Worsening of these indicators affects the stability of ﬁnancial system and may result in
a ﬁnancial crisis. As noted in Section 2, the indicators are selected by theoretical consid-
8. For a detailed exposition of factor analysis including references see e.g., Venables and Ripley (2002, Chap-
ter 11).
22eration as well as recent ﬁndings of empirical studies on ﬁnancial crises. Another major
consideration was the data availability on a monthly basis for our country coverage and
sample. The indicators can be clustered into four major groups:
External: real exchange rates (REX), export growth (EXG), import growth (IMP), terms
of trade (TOT), ratio of the current account to GDP (CAY), the ratio of M2 to
foreign exchange reserves (MFR) and growth of foreign exchange reserves (GFR).
Financial: M1 and M2 growth (GM1 and GM2), M2 money multiplier (MMM), the ra-
tio of domestic credit to GDP (DCY), excess real M1 balances (ERM), domestic
real interest rate (RIR), lending and deposit rate spread (LDS), commercial bank
deposits (CBD), and the ratio of bank reserves to bank assets (RRA).
Domestic (real and public): the ratio of ﬁscal balance to GDP (FBY), the ratio of public
debt to GDP (FBY), growth of industrial production (GIP), changes in stock prices
(CSP), inﬂation rate (INR), GDP per capita (YPC), and growth of national saving
(NSR).
Global: growthofworldoilprices(WOP),USinterestrate(USI),andOECDGDPgrowth
(ICY).
Table 7 lists deﬁnitions, sources and transformations of our crises indicators. Two types of
transformation are applied to make sure that the indicators are free from seasonal effects
and stationary, i.e. 12-months percentage change and deviation from linear trends. In case
the indicator has no visible seasonal pattern and is nontrending, its level form is main-
tained. Some unavailable indicators are proxied by closely related indicators, for example
OECD GDP is substituted by industrial production of industrial countries.
As already argued, we cannot include the full set of 26 indicators as explanatory variables
in our logit model, because of too few observations on some of the ﬁnancial crises and
multicollinearity among the indicators. Instead we summarize the information in a limited
number of factors. Factor analysis on the full set applying the scree plot criterion described
above results in a small number of orthogonal factors, which do not have a straightforward
economic meaning.9 Therefore we calculate factors for each group of indicators. The scree
plot criterion in our case results in one or two factors for each group. More information is
given below.
9. Note that if we apply the standard Kaiser criterion of eigenvalues larger than one on the full set of 26
indicators, we obtain eight factors and the economic interpretation is even harder.
23Table 7: Explanatory variables: deﬁnition, source, and transformation
Indicator Code Deﬁnition and source Transformation
External sector (current account)
Real exchange rate REX Nominal exchange rate is local currency unit (LCU) per
USD, IFS-AE. The CPI is IFS-64. The real exchange rate
is the ratio of foreign (US CPI) to domestic prices (mea-
sured in the same currency). Thus, REX = ePf /P, where
e = nominal exchange rate, P = domestic price (CPI), and
Pf = foreign price (US CPI). A decline in the real exchange
rate denotes a real appreciation of the LCU.
Deviation from
trend
Export growth EXG IFS-70.D 12 month percent-
age change
Import growth IMP IFS-71.D 12 month percent-
age change)
Terms of trade TOT Unit value of exports divided by the unit value of imports.
Unit value of exports is IFS-74.D. Import unit value for
country (IFS-75.D) is not available, instead exports prices
of industrialized countries is used, IFS-110.74.D.
12 month percent-
age change
Ratio of the current
account to GDP
CAY Current account (IFS-78AL) divided by nominal GDP (in-
terpolated of IFS-99B).
-
External sector (capital account)
Ratio of M2 to for-
eign exchange re-
serves
MFR Ratio of M2 (IFS-34 plus IFS-35) and international reserves
(IFS-1L.D). M2 is converted into USD.
12 month percent-
age change
Growth of foreign
exchange reserves
GFR IFS-1L.D 12 month percent-
age change
Financial sector
M1 growth GM1 IFS-34 12 month percent-
age change
M2 growth GM2 IFS-35 12 month percent-
age change
M2 money multi-
plier
MMM Ratio of M2 (IFS-34 plus IFS-35) to base (reserve) money
(IFS-14).
12 month percent-
age change
Ratio of domestic
credit to GDP
DCY Total domestic credit (IFS-32) divided by nominal GDP (in-
terpolated of IFS-99B).
12 month percent-
age change
Excess real M1 bal-
ance
ERM Percentage difference between M1 (IFS-34) deﬂated by CPI
(IFS-64) and estimated demand for M1. Demand for real
M1 is estimated as function of real GDP, nominal interest
rates (IFS-60L), and a time trend. If monthly real GDP data
is not available for a country, then its annual counterpart
(IFS-99BP) is interpolated to monthly data.
Based on estimated
money demand
equation
Domestic real inter-
est rate
RIR 6 month time deposit (IFS- 60L) deﬂated by CPI (IFS-64) -
Lending and
deposit rate spread
LDS Lending interest rate (IFS-60P) divided by 6 month time
deposit rate (IFS-60L)
-
Commercial bank
deposits
CBD Demand deposit (IFS-24) plus time, savings and foreign
currency deposits (IFS-25) deﬂated by CPI (IFS-64)
12 month percent-
age change
Ratio bank reserves
to bank assets
RRA Bank reserves (IFS-20) divided by bank assets (IFS-21 plus
IFS-22a to IFS-22f)
-
to be continued
24(Table 7 continued)
Indicator Code Deﬁnition and source Transformation
Domestic real and public sector
Ratio of ﬁscal bal-
ance to GDP
FBY Government budget balance (IFS-80) divided by nominal
GDP (interpolated IFS-99B).
-
Ratio of public debt
to GDP
PBY Public and publicly guaranteed debt (World Bank) divided
by nominal GDP (interpolated IFS-99B).
-
Growth of indus-
trial production
GIP Industrial production index for Country is not avail-
able, then index of primary production (crude petroleum,
IFS.66AA) is used
12 month percent-
age change
Changes in stock
prices
CSP IFS-62 12 month percent-
age change
Inﬂation rate INR IFS-64. 12 month percent-
age change
GDP per capita YPC GDP(interpolatedIFS-99B)dividedbytotalpopulation(in-
terpolated IFS-99Z).
12 month percent-
age change
National savings NSR public (IFS-91F) and private consumption (IFS-96F) sub-
tracted from GDP (interpolated IFS-99B).
12 month percent-
age change
Global economy
Growth of world oil
prices
WOP IFS-176.AA 12 month percent-
age change
US interest rate USI US treasury bill rate (IFS-111.60C) 12 month percent-
age change
OECD GDP
growth
ICY Proxied by industrial production (IFS-66). 12 month percent-
age change
A disadvantage of factor analysis applied to groups of indicators is the fact that the fac-
tors need not be orthogonal any more. The correlation between the factor of the group of
ﬁnancial indicators and the factor of the group of the domestic (real and public) indicators
is around 0.7 with a huge inﬂuence on the logit parameter estimates. So, we apply factor
analysis on the combined group. Two factors emerge, which are orthogonal by construc-
tion. In the end we identify ﬁve factors: two factors from the set of external indicators
(explaining 47% of total variance of the group), two factors from the combined set of ﬁ-
nancial and domestic indicators (explaining 39% of total variance of the group) and one
factor in the group of global indicators (explaining 55% of total variance of the group).
Corresponding scree plots are in Figure 3.
25Figure 3: Scree plots
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26Table 8: Correlation between factors and indicators and the proportion of the variance
explained by the factors (h2)
External Financial & Domestic Global
factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4 factor 5
REX 0.00 0.33 GM1 0.90 0.00 WOP 0.46
EXG 0.83 −0.02 GM2 0.93 0.04 USI 0.88
IMP 0.76 −0.18 MMM −0.08 −0.08 ICY 0.82
TOT 0.69 −0.15 DCY −0.16 0.30
CAY −0.21 0.36 ERM 0.09 0.17
MFR −0.19 −0.82 RIR −0.04 0.90
GFR 0.27 0.63 LDS −0.07 −0.19
CBD 0.71 0.46
RRA 0.24 −0.39
FBY 0.02 −0.06
PBY −0.16 −0.06
GIP 0.35 0.07
CSP 0.24 0.12
INR −0.01 −0.88
YPC 0.90 −0.17
NSR 0.82 −0.16
h2 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.14 0.55
The ﬁrst two factors relate to external indicators. We observe that the ﬁrst factor is driven
by current account variables (export growth EXG, import growth IMP and terms of trade
TOT) and the second factor captures variations of variables related to the capital account
(the ratio of M2 and foreign reserves MFR, growth of international reserves GFR). The
third and the fourth factor summarize ﬁnancial and domestic indicators. The former cor-
responds to ﬂows (in values or in rate of growth): money growth (GM1 and GM2), com-
mercial bank deposits (CBD), GDP per capita (YPC) and the growth of national savings
(NSR); the latter with prices: domestic real interest rates (RIR) and inﬂation (INR). The
global factor, the ﬁfth, captures variations in the US interest rate (USI) and OECD output
growth (ICY).
Table 9 lists the correlation coefﬁcients between our ﬁve factors in pairs. The ﬁrst and
second factor and the third and fourth factor are indeed not correlated. The maximum
correlation between the factors is in the order of 0.5.
27Table 9: Correlation between factors
1 2 3 4
1
2 0.00
3 0.47 −0.06
4 0.40 −0.01 0.00
5 0.52 0.05 0.27 0.22
4.2 Logit model
Since our dependent variable is a binary variable (0=no crisis and 1=crisis) we use the
logit model. Suppose the probability model is speciﬁed as
P = F(Z) =
1
1 + e−Z =
1
1 + e−(α+βX), (5)
where P is the probability that Z takes the value 1 and F is the cumulative logistic proba-
bility function; X is the set of regressors and α and β are parameters. It can be shown that
the regression equation is equal to
ln
P
1 − P
= Z = α + βX. (6)
The vector of explanatory variables X consists of the factors and not of the huge list of
economic indicators themselves. Tests for ﬁxed effects reject the null of common effects
in ﬁve out of six cases. Only in FR’s method of currency crises we tested for time (month)
effects as well, but these where rejected. In the other cases the number of observations is
insufﬁcient to properly test for time effects, see Table 6 above.
The estimation results presented in Table 10 allow a number of conclusions. In the case of
debt crises and Z-type currency crises model the null of common effects is not rejected at
the 5% level: the common intercept in both cases is signiﬁcant at 1%. In the other cases the
null of common effects is rejected in favour of ﬁxed effects. Fixed effects are all signiﬁcant
at the 1% level implying country-speciﬁc intercepts.
The main conclusion refers to the signiﬁcance of the constructed factors. All factors, ex-
cept the ﬁrst one, are signiﬁcant at the 5% level in at least one crises model:
Factor 1 — related to growth of exports and imports and the terms of trade — is not
signiﬁcant at 5% in any of the models.
Factor 2 — related to the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves and the growth of foreign re-
serves — is signiﬁcant in the ERW-type, the KLR-type and the Z-type of currency
crises models and also in the banking crises model.
Factor 3 — related to money growth (M1 and M2), rates of growth of bank deposits, the
28growth of GDP per capita and growth of domestic savings — is signiﬁcant in all
models including all types of currency crises models.
Factor 4 — related to the domestic real interest rate and inﬂation — is signiﬁcant in the
KLR-type, the FR-type and also in the banking crises model.
Factor 5 — related to the US interest rate and OECD output growth — is signiﬁcant in
the ERW-type, the KLR-type and the Z-type of currency crises models.
When we compare the four versions of the currency crises models, differences in terms
of signiﬁcant factors come to the fore. The external sector plays an important role only
throughthecapitalaccount(factor2).Factor3—moneygrowthandbankdeposits—appears
in all currency models. Moreover the estimated coefﬁcient for this factor is the highest in
absolute terms in all currency models. Factor 2—the ratio of M2 to international reserves
and growth of foreign reserves—enters all currency crisis models except the FR version.
Factor 4—domestic real interest rate and inﬂation—is signiﬁcant in the KLR and FR ver-
sions of currency models but does not show up in the ERW-type and Z-type currency
models. Factor 5—US interest rate and OECD output growth— only matters in the ERW
version, KLR version and Z version of the currency model. We have already noted that
factor 1 (current account) does not matter for all ﬁnancial crisis models. Banking crises
are inﬂuenced by factor 2–4. Global indicators, factor 5, do not play a role here. Finally,
indicators included in the third factor—money growth and bank deposits—seems to be the
only relevant ones for debt crises.
Our results deviate from the theoretically expected ones as reported in Table 1 in a number
of cases. First, in our models export and import growth, terms of trade and inﬂation rate
do not inﬂuence debt crises. Secondly, the global indicators (US inﬂation rate and OECD
output growth) and terms of trade do not have an impact on banking crises. Thirdly, cur-
rency crises are not ampliﬁed by the external sector indicators, terms of trade and growth
of exports and imports.
However the estimation results in Table 10 are consistent with the empirical literature as
summarized in Table 2. In our debt crises model, output per capita is strongly related to the
probability of debt rescheduling. This result is in accordance with the ﬁndings of Lanoie
and Lemarbre (1996). We ﬁnd that the inﬂation rate, GDP per capita and the ratio of M2 to
international reserves are signiﬁcantly associated with banking crises. A similar result is
found by Dermirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2000). The ratio of M2 over foreign reserves,
a proxy for liquidity of the ﬁnancial system, is an important determinant in our currency
crises models, in line with Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), Berg and Pattillo
(1999), and Edison (2003). In addition, we ﬁnd support for the conclusion of Kamin,
Schindler, and Samuel (2001) that other indicators like the growth of money (M1 and
M2) and global indicators (US interest rates and OECD output growth) play a role in
determining the onset of currency crises.
The models discussed above to do not consider lags in the various factors. Nor do the mod-
els account for any linkages between crises within and across countries. These extensions
will be dealt with in future research.
29Table 10: Estimation results of the multivariate binomial logit model including ﬁve factors.
Currency crises
ERW KLR FR
Coefﬁcient z-statistic Coefﬁcient z-statistic Coefﬁcient z-statistic
constant
Indonesia −4.54 −11.03 −5.16 −10.80 −0.87 −7.42
Malaysia −4.10 −11.44 −4.38 −11.46 −0.39 −3.65
Philippines −4.53 −11.51 −4.64 −11.95 −0.62 −5.47
Singapore −3.44 −11.86 −3.85 −11.59 −0.31 −2.91
South Korea −4.45 −10.70 −4.79 −10.63 −0.73 −6.54
Thailand −4.02 −10.52 −4.45 −10.70 −1.02 −8.17
factor 1 −0.23 −1.04 −0.08 −0.33 0.03 0.42
factor 2 −0.30 −2.59 −0.31 −2.54 0.05 0.90
factor 3 −0.94 −6.52 −1.26 −8.21 −0.29 −5.25
factor 4 −0.15 −0.97 −0.36 −2.18 −0.13 −2.38
factor 5 0.62 3.29 0.88 4.17 −0.06 −1.08
Observations 60 58 801
Likelihood ratio statistic 71.08 108.70 51.53
McFadden R2 0.13 0.20 0.02
Currency crises
Z Banking crises Debt crises
Coefﬁcient z-statistic Coefﬁcient z-statistic Coefﬁcient z-statistic
constant −2.46 −30.12 −5.08 −18.43
Indonesia −4.32 −10.23
Malaysia −4.34 −10.34
Philippines −4.41 −11.12
Singapore −5.59 −7.68
South Korea −3.76 −11.08
Thailand −4.90 −11.10
factor 1 0.18 1.72 −0.39 −1.32 0.37 1.60
factor 2 −0.40 −6.19 0.68 3.34 0.19 0.86
factor 3 −0.60 −7.10 −0.54 −3.51 −0.57 −2.56
factor 4 −0.14 −1.72 −0.47 −2.28 0.22 1.14
factor 5 0.17 1.92 0.18 0.83 −0.26 −0.93
Observations 209 48 19
Likelihood ratio statistic 81.37 75.67 15.84
McFadden R2 0.06 0.17 0.07
Notes: ERW, KLR, FR, and Z denote currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz,
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, respectively.
Critical values of the Z-statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 2.57, 1.86 and 1.65, respectively. The
common effects model is rejected at the 5% level in all models, except the Z-version of the currency crisis
model and the debt crisis model (DC). Time effects—if tested signiﬁcantly—do not affect the factor parameter
estimates and, hence, are not included.
In all cases, the likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis that the slope coefﬁcients of the factors are all equal
to zero at the 5% level (the critical value is 11.07).
304.3 Signaling crises
The logit models discussed above estimate probabilities of crises to occur. High probabil-
ities signal crises. But the model might also give false signals, i.e., a crisis does not take
place despite the logit model producing a high probability. There are four possibilities.
A model may indicate a crisis (high estimated probability) when a crisis indeed occurs
(P(1,1)) or it may indicate a crisis when no crisis actually takes place (P(1,0)). It is also
possible that the model does not signal a crisis (low estimated probability) where in fact a
crisis does occur (P(0,1)). The ﬁnal possibility (P(0,0)) is a situation in which the model
does not predict a crisis and no crisis occurs. Table 11 lists the four possibilities.
Table 11: The probabilities of right and wrong crisis predictions
Crisis (Z = 1) No crisis (Z = 0)
high P(1,1) P(1,0)
Estimated probability
low P(0,1) = 1 − P(1,1) P(0,0) = 1 − P(1,0)
The model signals a crisis when the estimated probability is high. We calculate the proba-
bility in periods detected as crises as:
P(1,1) =
P
t ˆ PtZt P
t Zt
, (7)
where ˆ Pt is the estimated probability from the logit model at time t and Zt is the cri-
sis index dummy which equals one if a crisis occurs at time t, and zero otherwise. The
probability in periods not detected as crises is denoted as P(1,0):
P(1,0) =
P
t ˆ Pt(1 − Zt)
P
t(1 − Zt)
(8)
This is a false signal or noise. Note that P(0,1) = 1 − P(1,1) is also a false signal: the
estimated probability is low, whereas a crisis did occur. Similarly, P(0,0) = 1 − P(1,0)
is a correct signal, since the estimated probability is low and there is no crisis.
Now, we can calculate the signal-to-noise ratio S/N as a measure of performance of the
model:
S
N
=
P(1,1) + P(0,0)
P(1,0) + P(0,1)
. (9)
A value below one indicates that the model gives more false than right signals. The higher
the signal-to-noise ratio, the better the model performs. A number like 1.5 indicates that
the model indicates a signal level which is 50% above the noise level.
Table 12 lists the good (P(1,1)) and bad (P(1,0)) crisis signals and the signal to noise
ratio for the various types of ﬁnancial crises and the six Asian countries in our sample.
From the signal-to-noise ratio it is easily seen that the currency crisis models based on the
31Table 12: Signalling crises instantaneously
Currency crises
ERW KLR FR Z Banking crises Debt crises
Indonesia P(1,1) 0.13 0.19 0.34 0.14 0.25 0.10
P(1,0) 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.02 0.01
S/N 1.25 1.40 1.15 1.09 1.58 1.21
Malaysia P(1,1) 0.08 0.12 0.40 0.12 0.04 −
P(1,0) 0.02 0.02 0.41 0.09 0.02 0.01
S/N 1.12 1.20 0.99 1.05 1.05 −
Philippines P(1,1) 0.11 0.14 0.38 0.18 0.02 0.01
P(1,0) 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.11 0.02 0.01
S/N 1.19 1.24 1.03 1.16 1.00 1.00
Singapore P(1,1) 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.08 0.03 −
P(1,0) 0.04 0.03 0.42 0.08 0.01 0.01
S/N 1.03 1.08 1.01 1.01 1.05 −
South Korea P(1,1) 0.08 0.12 0.34 0.16 0.16 0.02
P(1,0) 0.02 0.02 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.01
S/N 1.14 1.22 1.09 1.15 1.30 1.02
Thailand P(1,1) 0.13 0.22 0.30 0.12 0.05 −
P(1,0) 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.06 0.02 0.01
S/N 1.25 1.49 1.02 1.12 1.05 −
Notes: ERW, KLR, FR, and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, respectively.
P(1,1)=the estimated probability is high and a crisis does occur; P(1,0)=the estimated probability is high
and a crisis does not occur; S/N is the signal-to-noise ratio; — means no crisis observations.
dating methodology of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) and Eichengreen, Rose
and Wyplosz (ERW) outperform the other models.
Table 12 calculates the signal-to-noise ratios when a model signals a crisis in the same
month as the crisis occurs. However, the models may signal a crisis which actually happens
in the near future. Table 13 calculates the signal-to-noise ratios in cases where the model
leads future crises with the lead ranging from zero (as in Table 12) to four quarters.
32Table 13: Signal-to-noise ratio for various leads of the crisis index
Currency crises
Lead ERW KLR FR Z Banking crises Debt crises
Indonesia 0 1.25 1.40 1.15 1.09 1.58 1.21
1 1.23 1.22 1.15 1.06 1.42 1.16
2 1.20 1.19 1.14 1.05 1.58 1.16
3 1.23 1.22 1.13 1.03 1.76 1.15
4 1.22 1.24 1.11 1.02 1.56 1.14
Malaysia 0 1.12 1.20 0.99 1.05 1.05 −
1 1.06 1.09 1.00 1.02 1.06 −
2 1.04 1.05 0.98 1.01 1.07 −
3 1.02 1.02 0.99 1.00 1.10 −
4 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.10 −
Philippines 0 1.19 1.24 1.03 1.16 1.00 1.00
1 1.11 1.11 1.03 1.13 0.99 1.00
2 1.05 1.03 1.01 1.09 1.01 1.00
3 1.05 1.03 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.00
4 1.03 1.01 1.00 1.07 1.01 1.00
Singapore 0 1.03 1.08 1.01 1.01 1.05 −
1 1.01 1.03 1.02 0.99 1.05 −
2 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.05 −
3 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.03 −
4 1.01 1.03 1.00 0.99 1.02 −
South Korea 0 1.14 1.22 1.09 1.15 1.30 1.02
1 1.03 1.04 1.10 1.10 1.27 1.03
2 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.05 1.27 1.01
3 1.00 0.99 1.08 1.02 1.30 1.00
4 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.01 1.31 1.00
Thailand 0 1.25 1.49 1.02 1.12 1.05 −
1 1.20 1.32 1.04 1.09 1.04 −
2 1.15 1.21 1.02 1.07 1.05 −
3 1.11 1.15 1.02 1.06 1.04 −
4 1.09 1.11 1.03 1.05 1.03 −
Notes: ERW, KLR, FR, and Z represent currency crises dated by the method of Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, respectively.
— means no crisis observations.
33Table 13 allow a number of conclusions. The previous ﬁnding that the currency crises
model based on the dating methodology of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) and
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (ERW) outperforms the other currency crisis methods
remains valid. In general, the further away the future crises, the lower the signal-to-noise
ratios. There are exceptions: the Frankel and Rose type of currency crisis model (FR)
produces the best signal for currency crises one quarter ahead, whereas for the other types
of currency crisis methods the signal is strongest for contemporaneous crises. For most
countries considered the banking crises models produce the best signal for crises two or
three quarters ahead. Comparing country performance, currency crisis models do a poor
job in signalling crises for Singapore. Banking crises and debt crises models have a good
performance in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio for Indonesia.
Finally, we perform an out-of-sample experiment for the year 2002 for the six Asian coun-
tries in our sample. Table 14 presents some summary statistics. The top panel lists the
number of crises detected by the various dating schemes, the bottom panel predicted prob-
abilities. Frankel and Rose ﬁnd the largest number of currency crises and indeed the aver-
age predicted probabilities are highest. In the previous in-sample experiment we identiﬁed
the currency crises models based on the dating methodology of Kaminsky, Lizondo and
Reinhart (KLR) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (ERW) as the ‘best’. These dating
methods identify currency crises in the Philippines and in Thailand, both in January 2002.
However, the estimated probabilities over the year 2002 for both methods never exceed
10%; currency crises are not picked up instantaneously.
Table 14: Predicted crisis probabilities for 2002
Currency crises
ERW KLR FR Z Banking crises Debt crises
Number of crises
Indonesia 0 0 5 0 1 1
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 1 0 6 0 0 0
Singapore 0 0 5 0 0 0
South Korea 0 0 5 0 0 0
Thailand 1 0 5 0 2 0
Predicted probabilities
Mean 0.023 0.016 0.382 0.108 0.015 0.008
Median 0.014 0.007 0.359 0.075 0.012 0.007
Maximum 0.091 0.079 0.554 0.357 0.039 0.018
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.206 0.011 0.001 0.003
Std. dev. 0.022 0.019 0.095 0.086 0.011 0.003
Note:ERW,KLR,FR,andZrepresentcurrencycrisesdatedbythemethodofEichengreen,RoseandWyplosz,
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, Frankel and Rose, and Zhang, respectively.
345. Conclusion
Financial crises incur large costs which makes the construction of a monitoring tool, the
so-called early warning system (EWS) very important. A common feature of all existing
EWS’s is the use of fundamental determinants of the domestic and external sectors as
explanatory variables. In the literature different types of models are suggested. The most
popular one is qualitative response models (logit or probit).
This paper builds an econometric EWS of six Asian countries, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. We set up qualitative choice—in our case
logit—models for three categories of ﬁnancial crises, currency crisis, banking crisis and
debt crisis. From the literature we extract a broad set of potentially relevant ﬁnancial crisis
indicators which are combined using factor analysis. These factors are used as explanatory
variables in a panel covering the period January 1970–December 2001.
The ﬁrst two factors relate to external indicators. We observe that the ﬁrst factor is driven
by current account variables whilethe second factor captures variations of variables related
to the capital account. The third and the fourth factor summarize ﬁnancial and domestic
indicators. The former correlates with ﬂows (in values or in rates of growth); the latter with
prices. The global factor, the ﬁfth, captures variations in the US interest rate and OECD
output growth.
The factor analysis outcomes in combination with the estimation results of the logit model
allows the general conclusion that (some) indicators of ﬁnancial crises do work, at least in
our EWS of Asia. Our method offers a solution to the bad performance (mixed and weak
in timing of crisis) of EWS as noted by Edison (2003). We ﬁnd that the rates of growth of
money (M1 and M2), bank deposits, GDP per capita and national savings correlate with all
three types of ﬁnancial crises, whereas the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves, and the growth
of foreign reserves, the domestic real interest rate and inﬂation play an additional role in
banking crises and some varieties of currency crises.
An additional feature of this paper is that we distinguish four currency crisis dating deﬁni-
tions. A within-sample signal extraction experiment revealed that the methods of Eichen-
green, Rose and Wyplosz and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhard are superior to the dating
schemes of Frenkel and Rose, and Zhang.
There are differences in terms of factor signiﬁcance when we compare the four versions of
the currency crises models. Money growth and bank deposits are signiﬁcant in all currency
models. In addition the estimated coefﬁcient for this factor is the highest in absolute terms
in all currency models. Foreign reserves enter all currency models except the Frankel and
Rose model. The domestic real interest rate and inﬂation only matter in the Kaminsky,
Lizondo and Reinhard and the Frankel and Rose versions of the currency model. Global
indicators are signiﬁcant in all currency models except in the Frankel and Rose version.
The current account indicators do not affect ﬁnancial crises. The same holds for current ac-
count and the global indicators and banking crises. Only money growth and bank deposits
seem to play a role the debt crises model.
35Based on an in-sample experiment (signal-to-noise ratios) we conclude that the currency
crises models based on the dating methodology of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart and
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz outperform the other models. In general, the further away
the future crises, the lower the signal-to-noise ratios. However, the Frankel and Rose type
of currency crises model signals crises one quarter ahead, whereas the other types of cur-
rency crises models signal crises without a lead. For most countries considered the banking
crises models signal crises two or three quarters ahead. Comparing country performance,
currency crises models do a poor job in signaling crises for Singapore. Banking crises and
debt crises models have a good performance in signaling crises in Indonesia.
Finally, we performed an out-of-sample experiment for the year 2002. The dating method-
ology of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz identify
currency crises in the Philippines and in Thailand, both in January 2002. However, our
models fail to pick up these currency crises.
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